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1. INTRODUCTION
This paper considers the delicate question of whether changes to the structure  and level 
of legal aid payments significantly affects the trajectories of criminal cases, including 
how defence lawyers handle cases and the sensitive question of how they advise their 
clients’ in their pleading decisions. In recent years,  Scotland4, like other common law 
countries, has made major changes to the remuneration structures for criminal defence 
work.  This  paper  reports  on  recent  research  examining  the  impact  of  one  of  these 
changes: the move to ‘fixed payments’. In so doing, this paper also seeks to contribute to 
international knowledge about the relationship between legal aid payment regimes and 
criminal case trajectories, including the handling of cases by lawyers and plea decision-
making. Furthermore, if any changes are observed as a consequence of the restructuring 
of legal aid remuneration, do these have any important consequences for clients, or, are 
any observed changes simply absorbed by lawyers, or neutralised by other developments? 
During the 1980s and 1990s, the overall cost of criminal legal aid in both the jurisdictions 
of England and Wales, and of Scotland, rose both in real terms and above the rate of 
increase in public spending: a phenomenon which has produced intense concern among 
successive  governments  in  both  countries.5 The  cause  of  these  rises  has  been  hotly 
debated  both  within  governments  and among academic  researchers  (Gray,  Fenn,  and 
Rickman 1996; Stephen 1998; Cape and Moorhead 2005; Bridges 2001; Bevan 1996). 
Gray et al.’s economic analysis suggested that the introduction in England and Wales of 
standard fees in the magistrates’ court in 1993 led to: a reduction in the amount of non-
core  work;  increased  work  which  was  paid  outside  standard  fee;  and claim splitting 
(Gray, Fenn, and Rickman 1999). Although the assumptions upon which Gray  et al.’s 
research is based have been strongly criticised by a range of commentators (Cape and 
Moorhead 2005; Samuel 1996; Sommerlad 1996; Wall 1996; Bridges 2001), to date there 
has been relatively little published direct empirical examination of the effects of standard 
fees for summary work.6  Given the favour with which the basic concept of block fees, 
(upon which both fixed and standard fees are based), is viewed by governments7,  the 
need for direct empirical  examination of the impact  of block fee arrangements in the 
provision of criminal defence services seems all the more acute.
4 Scotland has a separate system of criminal law and criminal justice from that of England and Wales, with 
appeals being heard by the Court of Criminal Appeal in Edinburgh (there is no appeal in criminal cases to 
the House of Lords). The legal profession of Scotland is separate from that of England and Wales, as is the 
independent prosecution service - Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS).   
5 Analysis of these trends in England and Wales and Scotland can be found in a comparative studies by 
Goriely, Tata, and Paterson (1997); Stephen (1998); Tata (1999).
6 Cape and Moorhead (2005) recently analysed criminal cost drivers from which subsequent research can 
proceed. Quirk and Pleasence (2001) carried out a thorough investigation of Crown Court cases as the basis 
for which contracting systems could develop in the Crown Court. Bridges (2001), in an unpublished paper, 
provides a rebuttal of the ‘case-splitting’ hypothesis advanced by Gray et al. (1996).
7 See for example, in England and Wales, Department of Constitutional Affairs (2005) which was the base 
document for the recent review by Lord Carter of Legal Aid Procurement (February 2006).
2. THE INTRODUCTION OF FIXED PAYMENTS
Under the new system of fixed payments8 in Scottish summary courts solicitors receive a 
basic payment of £300 (plus VAT) per case in the District Court and £500 (plus VAT) 
per case in the Sheriff Court.9 These sums cover all work from an initial not guilty plea at 
the pleading diet10 up until trial. After the first 30 minutes of the trial, further payments 
are available, as well as, inter alia, for bail appeals and deferred sentences. Solicitors can 
no  longer  claim  additional  payments  for  costs  associated  with  preparing  the  case, 
although there  are  a  few exceptions  (e.g.  medical  reports),  which can be  claimed in 
addition to the basic fixed fee. Payments are made for blocks of work: £500 in the Sheriff 
Court for any work done up to and including the first 30 minutes of trial (including cases 
heard in the District Court but coming before stipendiary magistrates). After the first 30 
minutes of trial the first day of a trial attracts an additional £100 and the second day £200. 
In the District Court all work up to the first 30 minutes of trial attracts £300 after which 
the payments are an additional £50 per day. Partly in response to challenges regarding the 
ability of fixed payments to ensure a fair trial11, this simple system of fixed payments was 
amended in June 2002 to allow for unusually complex and difficult  cases (known as 
“exceptional cases”) to receive payment under the system of itemised billing known as 
‘time and line’. The determination of what constitutes an ‘exceptional case’ is made by 
the Scottish Legal Aid Board (SLAB), which reported in 2004 that it had granted only 28 
applications out of a mere 158 applications for time and line payments on the basis of an 
“exceptional case” (SLAB  2004). While fixed payments share certain similarities with 
standard  fees  in  England  and  Wales,  the  fixed  payment  regime  is  much  simpler.  In 
contrast to standard fees in England and Wales, where an initial not guilty plea has been 
tendered and summary legal  aid  has  been granted,  under  fixed payments  there  is  no 
system of ‘higher’ and ‘lower limits’ to payment; and there is very little ‘additional work’ 
which can be claimed. Furthermore, under fixed payments there is no hourly calculation 
for particular tasks such as attendance at court; preparation; advocacy etc. (LSC CDS 
‘Focus’ newsletters; Ling and Pugh 2003).  Another distinction is that under the Scottish 
system when a plea of guilty is tendered at the Pleading Diet, Summary Legal Aid is not 
available.  Only the much lower payments made under Advice & Assistance (A&A) and 
Advice By Way of Representation (ABWOR) may be accessed.
The introduction of fixed payments was seen by its proponents as a way to “give a fair 
level of remuneration to the legal profession while at the same time ensuring that the 
taxpayer  in  Scotland  receives  value  for  money  from the  criminal  legal  aid  system” 
(SLAB  1998).  At  the  time  of  announcement  and  introduction  it  was  argued  by 
representatives  of  the  legal  profession  that  fixed  fees  would  lead  to  diminished  and 
fluctuating incomes for solicitors providing criminal defence services and, in the long 
8 Also widely known as fixed fees.
9 The Sheriff Courts (presided over by sheriffs who are professional lawyers by background) and hear both 
solemn (jury-triable) and summary (non jury triable) cases. The District Courts are largely presided over by 
lay justices (although in Glasgow they are presided over by stipendiary magistrates and have the same 
sentencing  powers  of  the summary sheriff  courts)  and hear  summary cases  only.  Unlike England and 
Wales, the ‘accused’ person has no right to elect for jury trial.
10 The ‘pleading diet’ is the first opportunity to plead.
11 Gayne v Vannet 2000 SCCR 5, 1999 SLT 1292; Buchanan v McLean 2001 SCCR 475.
run, to a reduction in the number of solicitors providing these services (Law Society of 
Scotland, 1998). 
However, those in favour of fixed payments tend to argue that this is a case of ‘swings 
and roundabouts’.  So although on a case-by-case basis  the system of payment  is  not 
proportional to the work done, over the longer run gains and losses cancel each other out. 
The thinking is that solicitors will make the appropriate professional judgement as to the 
amount of work required by any particular case. In interviews for this research, SLAB 
officials argued that relatively difficult cases are underpaid (ie lose on the swings), and 
straightforward cases are overpaid (gain on the roundabouts). 
Commenting on the proposals for the introduction of fixed payments into criminal legal 
aid in October 1998, Minister of State for Home Affairs of the Scottish Office, Henry 
McLeish, said that “there will be some element of swings and roundabouts, but I am 
satisfied that taking their caseload as a whole, solicitors will be able to provide a quality 
service  for  the  payments  that  are  on  offer.”12 Critical  to  the  idea  of  swings  and 
roundabouts is the supposition that the arrangement of fixed payments will not affect the 
ability of solicitors to “continue to provide a quality service”. This idea of ‘swings and 
roundabouts’ (overall cost and quality neutrality) resembles two key justifications behind 
block contracting13 in England and Wales; and, indeed competitive tendering14.  The first 
supposition is that, over the long run, firms’ overall income will balance out.  However 
this balancing-out effect can only assist specialist firms doing a high volume of summary 
criminal casework.15  Secondly, explicitly at least, the impact of swings and roundabouts 
is supposed to be quality neutral: solicitors are said to be able to maintain “a quality 
service”, by continuing to give much greater attention to difficult cases and less time to 
straightforward  cases.  Whether  or  not  a  more  insidious  intention  of  the  principle  of 
swings and roundabouts is to diminish the adversarial character of defence work is harder 
to determine. However,  it may be important to note that the level of fee for Scottish 
summary cases was chosen at a level well below the average cost per case under time and 
line  and has  not  since  been  increased. 16 The  remainder  of  this  paper  describes  and 
discusses some of the findings of recently completed research into the impact of fixed 
payments.
i. The Fixed Payments Research 
12 Scottish Office News Release.
13 For example, Department of Constitutional Affairs (2005) at p23: “A block contract has the advantage of 
paying for a  specified  service to be delivered,  rather than hours  worked.  This creates  an incentive for 
suppliers to work more efficiently to increase their profits.”
14 See for example,  Department of Constitutional Affairs (2005).  See also the prescient discussions by 
Bridges (1996) and Sommerlad (1996).
15 See the projections made in Stephen (2001).
16 It was intended to reduce total legal aid expenditure on summary cases. The originally proposed fixed 
payments  implied a reduction in summary legal aid expenditure  of 25%.  After consultation the fixed 
payments were revised to a level which implied a reduction in expenditure of around 21%.  See discussion 
in Stephen (2001).
We were asked by the Scottish Executive Department of Justice to explore the impact of 
the introduction of fixed payments into summary legal aid.17 
(a) Research Methods
The research used a combination of quantitative and qualitative analysis to explore any 
impacts of the introduction of fixed payments, including those on: solicitor firm incomes; 
SLAB expenditure; the handling of cases by solicitors; and, the stage of conclusion of 
cases. 
As an initial stage of the research, we conducted a small number of face-to-face semi-
structured interviews (13)18 with senior personnel (known as ‘stakeholder19 interviews’). 
Partly  informed  by  the  face-to-face  semi-structured  stakeholder  interviews,  a  postal 
questionnaire survey was issued to non-stakeholder defence solicitors. SLAB provided 
the research team with the register of summary criminal legal aid defence practitioners. 
From this list a random sample of 300 was drawn and 92 completed questionnaires were 
received.20 The completion of the postal questionnaires led to a smaller but more in-depth 
telephone  survey  and  telephone  interviews  of  non-stakeholder  defence  solicitors.  62 
telephone interviews with defence solicitors, who were active in summary criminal legal 
aid, were conducted.21 The telephone survey consisted of both closed questions and more 
open  questions.22 Follow-up  face-to-face  interviews  with  ‘non-stakeholder’  defence 
solicitor were also conducted after the telephone survey. In addition to the face-to-face 
stakeholder  interviews  with  senior  members  of  Crown  Office  and  Procurator  Fiscal 
Service (COPFS) 17 depute fiscals (‘non-stakeholders’), from a range of different areas 
of the country, were interviewed.
Statistical analyses of two large disaggregated data sets were also conducted. We were 
given access to SLAB disaggregated data files. The statistical analysis of disaggregated 
data  allowed for  more  controlled  analysis  to  be  conducted  than is  possible  by using 
aggregated data (as is used in annual reports).  The analysis of disaggregated SLAB data 
17 The study ran from December 2003 to January 2005 and was assisted by a research advisory group 
convened by the Justice Department of the Scottish Executive which consisted of representatives of the 
Justice Department, SLAB, the Law Society of Scotland, local criminal bar associations, the Crown Office 
and Procurator Fiscal Service, the judiciary, and two independent academic experts in the area (Professor 
Peter Duff, professor of criminal justice, Aberdeen University Law School; and Professor Roger Bowles, 
co-Director of the Centre for Criminal Justice Economics and Psychology, York University). 
18 The  topic  guide for  these  semi-structured  interviews;  survey questionnaires;  interview schedules  for 
telephone interviews as well as more detailed description of the quantitative and qualitative methodologies 
used in the research are provided in Stephen and Tata (2006a).
19 Here, the term ‘stakeholder’ refers to persons who are representatives of professional organizations or 
agencies and/or responsible for the making of summary criminal justice policy or attempts to influence the 
making of summary criminal justice policy. 
20 The postal  questionnaire contained 13 questions seeking basic information about the respondent  and 
his/her firm.
21 It proved impossible to conduct a telephone interview with the remaining 30 respondents.
22 There  were 36 questions  exploring  the effect  of  fixed  payments  on four  main areas:  the  individual 
solicitor’s activities and behaviour; those of the firm; general comments on the impact of fixed payments; 
and, observations of the impact on other defence solicitors.
allowed detailed examination of income and expenditure, an important limitation of the 
SLAB data is that there is no case outcome data (e.g. stage of conclusion). However, data 
sets supplied by COPFS allowed the proportions of cases terminating at each of four 
main stages to be identified. The COPFS data provided was from 1991 to 2003. In line 
with previous work (Tata  et al. 2004 and Goriely  et al. 2001), the conclusion of cases 
was assigned to four broad stages: at the pleading diet (all cases terminating at or before 
the first plea was tendered); at the Intermediate Diet; before the trial has begun (including 
where a trial diet was held but before evidence was led); and at trial (i.e. after evidence 
was  led).  In  this  paper,  we  concentrate  particularly  on  describing  and discussing  the 
impact of fixed payments on case handling and case outcome and the analysis of data 
supplied by COPFS.23 
(b) Findings
At the time of announcement (and subsequent introduction in 1999) opponents of fixed 
payments predicted that it would lead to diminishing incomes for solicitors. Due to space 
constraints, it  is not possible to report and discuss here our findings on the impact of 
fixed payments on legal aid expenditure and on firm income. This is detailed in our full 
report which was first submitted to the Scottish Executive in January 2005 (Stephen and 
Tata, 2006).24 However, three points should be noted since they provide helpful context 
to the discussion of findings about the preparation of cases and case trajectories. First, 
fixed payments initially hit the income of specialist firms particularly hard, but by 2000-1 
income levels began to recover and by 2001/2 they were back to the levels of before the 
introduction of fixed payments. The second point is that both quantitative and qualitative 
evidence shows that most specialist  firms have adapted to fixed payments  by sharply 
increasing  the  caseloads  undertaken.25 Third,  client  contact26 was  reported  to  have 
decreased sharply as a direct result of the impact of fixed payments.27 In our telephone 
survey of criminal defence solicitors active in legal aid work, two thirds said their own 
levels of client contact were unaffected. However, only one third believed this to be true 
23 In order to estimate the impact of the introduction of fixed fees on the system, an event study analysis 
was performed using panel data methods. In particular, we use a ‘difference in difference model’, where we 
control  for  the  specificity  of  each  court.  This  specification  is  equivalent  to  a  two-way  fixed-effects 
regression. This method allows the statistical analysis to distinguish between effects which occur over time 
(such as changes in the remuneration system) and effects which are particular only to individual courts, 
(which might be described as encompassing individual court cultures), and are not a direct consequence of 
the  introduction  of  new national  policies,  such  as  fixed  payments.   More  detailed  explanation  of  the 
statistical analyses performed is provided in Stephen and Tata (2006a).
24 At the time of writing (December 2006), our full report (Stephen and Tata 2006) remains unpublished by 
the Scottish Executive.  Readers who wish to obtain a copy of the full 220 page report have had, we 
understand, to resort to requesting it under Freedom of Information legislation. However, publication of a 
short discussion on the financial impact on the impact on firms and legal aid expenditure was permitted to 
be published by the Scottish Executive - see Tata and Stephen (2006b)
25 These analyses of solicitor firm income and SLAB expenditure are described and discussed in detail 
elsewhere – Stephen and Tata (2006a).
26 Respondents were told that the term ‘client contact’ included visits to custody, written and telephone 
correspondence, meetings held at the office and any other forms of contact.
27 Both the level and nature of fixed payments were said to have had this effect. Space constraints mean that 
we can only report some of the results on this question. Fuller data is in Stephen and Tata (2006a).
of  other defence  solicitors.  Half  of  the  respondents  believed  client  contact  by  other 
defence solicitors had declined; and almost a third said their own client contact levels had 
declined as a consequence of the introduction of fixed payments. In our interviews with 
them  about  the  impact  of  fixed  payments,  senior  SLAB  officials  sought  to  draw  a 
distinction  between  what  is  necessary  to  progress  the  case  as  opposed  to  what  they 
regarded  as  relatively  superfluous  client-care.  However,  in  both  face-to-face  and 
telephone  interviews  several  defence  solicitors  suggested  that  the  reduction  in  client 
contact has led to less effective defence work
I think it has made it less effective…they want to spend time telling you whereas the clock is ticking 
and you do not have time to do that and it then becomes a case which you make no profit out of at all. 
[Telephone survey, defence solicitor 981494].
If somebody who may get the jail, whose life may be ruined em deserves half an hour of my 
time, they’re going to get 3 minutes of  my time [face to face non-stakeholder interview 
defence solicitor 4]
Indeed, research into client-lawyer interaction underlines the centrality of client contact 
and client care. In their study of legally aided clients, Sommerlad and Wall found that 
clients  judged  solicitors  on  a  variety  of  interpersonal  as  well  as  technical  criteria. 
Interpersonal criteria were judged highly important (Sommerlad and Wall 1999), a point 
which was emphasised by client interviews in Scotland (Goriely et al. 2001 and Tata et  
al. 2004). These studies confirm the point that unless solicitors established good rapport 
with clients, they can fail to elicit enough information to perform a technically competent 
service (Sommerlad and Wall 1999).
(c) Preparation and Precognitions
In contrast to many other English-speaking jurisdictions, traditionally, in Scotland there 
has  been no formal  systematic  provision for  advance disclosure by the prosecution.28 
Rather, a unique feature of Scottish criminal procedure has been that of precognitions, in 
which the prosecution provides a list of prosecution witnesses to the defence solicitor 
who then normally arranges for them to be interviewed and statements taken.29  In this 
way, the defence is made aware of the strength of the prosecution case and can advise the 
client accordingly. Earlier research showed that precognitions were widely regarded by 
defence solicitors as vital to the preparation of a case for trial and conducting a trial itself. 
However,  that  research  also  highlighted  that,  under  time  and  line,  the  payment  for 
precognitions work was open to abuse.30 
28 Recently, in law at least if not in routine practice, there has been a shift towards disclosure, which is 
discussed below. 
29 A precognition differs from a witness statement in that a precognition cannot be put to the witness in a 
trial. “Whereas a witness statement is essentially an account of what the witness has said, a precognition is 
a precognoscer’s account of the witness’s evidence.” (Christie and Moody 1999).
30 For the taking and review of precognitions solicitors could claim £21 per hour from SLAB. The going 
rate for precognition agents (routinely employed by firms to take witness precognitions) was around £8 per 
hour. Our interviews with defence solicitors suggested that while it was recognised that this was open to 
The new system of  fixed payments  expressly required that  the  taking and review of 
precognitions be covered by the fixed payment. It was widely reported, in our interviews, 
that there had been a sharp decline in the use of precognitions as a direct result of the 
introduction of fixed payments. We asked defence solicitors whether, as a result of the 
impact of fixed payments, they believed that: they, their firm and other defence solicitors 
made more, less, or the same use of precognitions.  
(‘Insert Table 1’)  
In semi-structured interviews with defence solicitors and with depute fiscals31, it was very 
widely  suggested  that  the  move  to  a  fixed  payment  system  has  provided  a  strong 
disincentive to conduct precognitions, and preparation more generally
[W]ith a block fee clearly your perception is that if you get that fee regardless of anything that you do 
then it doesn’t make a lot of economic sense… to be carrying out exhaustive investigations in cases. 
[Telephone survey 981498 defence solicitor]
No doubt whatsoever.  The general level of preparation is less than it was before. [Telephone Survey 
981384 non-stakeholder defence solicitor]
SLAB officials remarked that whether or not solicitors chose to take precognitions was a 
matter of professional judgement, but that in most cases it would be unnecessary as the 
strength of prosecution evidence would be immediately apparent to the defence solicitor. 
Well, for many criminal cases I can see why there’s no need – because there’s either evidence or 
there’s not, so they will need to take a judgment as to whether or not it’s necessary [Stake-holder 
face-to-face interview 4, SLAB].
Although  it  was  widely  acknowledged  that  defence  solicitors  had  to  become  more 
selective in their use of precognitions, what an appropriate ‘selection’ meant in practice 
was less straightforward than it was for SLAB officials:
If you don’t know what a case involves you don’t know what you have to look at, what the issues are, 
how complicated it is, what work you have to do and the system brought in is just a flat payment, the 
system is fundamentally flawed. [Telephone Survey 981498 defence solicitor].
There was a widespread view among both defence solicitors and prosecutors that there 
were  firms  which,  as  a  matter  of  routine,  have  given  up  precognosing  witnesses 
altogether This was confirmed by some in telephone and face-to-face interviews.
There is anecdotal evidence of firms that do no preparation at all in fixed fee cases…firms that simply 
submit  the  legal  aid  application  and leave  the file  completely  until  the  intermediate  diet  and do 
nothing, in which case obviously they make a fair amount of money because they’re doing no admin 
preparatory work whatsoever. [Face-to-face interview non-stakeholder defence solicitor interview 6]
abuse by a small minority, the vast majority of solicitors spent considerable time preparing precognition 
agents to take accounts; reading those accounts; and weighing them up in the client’s interest.  
31 Depute procurators fiscal (or ‘depute fiscals’) are rank and file prosecutors.
Nowadays certain firms do still instruct precognition agents, a lot don’t.  I did for the first 4 cases on a 
fixed fee basis and got 4 bills from the precognition agents and then said “well, I’m not doing that 
anymore”.  So I stopped it   [Face to face non-stakeholder interview defence solicitor 2]
They haven’t been precognoscing. And they’ve been keeping the £500… without any of it going on 
precognitions.  I mean I can understand why they do it I mean they’ve got their own costs, .…. In any 
particular case they may feel they can get by without precognitions then some of them will do that. 
[Stake-holder Interview 14, COPFS]
Partly  as  a  consequence  of  the  reported  decline  in  preparation  and  in  the  use  of 
precognitions in particular, it was widely reported that there was increased reliance on ad 
hoc summaries of evidence produced by the prosecution, which in turn is heavily reliant 
on police evidence.  Although in Scotland the prosecution is  entitled to intervene and 
direct police investigations, fiscals rarely take advantage of this power. Zuckerman has 
pointed out the consequence: “It follows that marking is entirely done on the basis of the 
police report and is therefore dominated by it. Whatever the fiscal sees, he sees through 
the policemen’s eyes.” (Zuckerman 1992 at pp. 330-1; see also Moody and Tombs 1982).
Whether or not the informal provision of summaries of the prosecution’s case adequately 
fills  the  gap left  by the decline in precognitions  is  highly debatable.  The practice  of 
providing summaries to the defence is neither automatic nor a requirement. 
There are stories of some firms that don’t precognose at all and simply rely on the fiscal’s 
office if they can get notes of evidence. [stake-holder interview 2, defence solicitor]
In a summary case now…I probably wouldn’t [precognose], I’d probably just go straight to 
the fiscal and find out from the fiscal what the evidence was likely to be. [face to face non-
stakeholder interview defence solicitor 5].
It appears that as a direct consequence of fixed payments, precognitions have diminished, 
but this has not been replaced by an adequate or speedy system of disclosure. The decline 
in  the  use  of  precognitions,  brought  about  by fixed  payments,  may also  have  had a 
postponing effect on pleading practices. Overall, this can have key consequences on the 
timing of guilty pleas. For example: 
where the client told you the position was basically a not guilty and without 
the evidence to say to them, ‘well, hang on a second that doesn’t make any 
sense.’  Sometimes clients who are under the influence of drink or drugs and 
have managed to come up with a memory of it that is totally at odds with 
what happened but I don’t have any statements so I can’t confront them with 
them.   If  they  plead  not  guilty  and  I  get  the  statements,  then  at  the 
intermediate diet I can sit them down and say ‘see what you told me before, 
that’s just complete rubbish.  Here’s what the statements are’ and at that 
point they may very well agree to change the plea….  [Stakeholder interview 
2,  defence solicitor]
Furthermore,  prosecution  interviewees  observed  that  the  move  to  fixed 
payments  added  an  additional  incentive  to  the  advice  to  plead  not  guilty 
where prosecution evidence had not been disclosed:
if your client wasn’t giving you any clear instructions to plead guilty and there 
was an element of doubt in his story, but you were almost there, you were 
almost…you knew that he’d been involved, you knew that in all probability 
he was guilty but his clear instructions were not to plead guilty and he was 
looking for further advice, sometimes you felt inhibited because you didn’t 
have the full story. You don’t have any of the papers that the Crown have 
got and ‘em. You’re just hearing his side of it and it’s very very easy to say 
… ‘well lets reserve your position we’ll put in a not guilty plea at the moment. 
And then we’ll  investigate it  and once it’s been investigated we’ll  be in a 
position to advise you of what the evidence is against you’ and that’ll inform 
your instructions to us. But that’s far too easy because under time and line 
and under fixed fee legal aid there’s also the added bonus to the defence 
agent that he gets paid. Then if that is the situation it would almost be silly 
not  to  advise  your  clients  to  hold  off  if  he’s  not  100  percent  sure.” 
[Stakeholder interview 14,  COPFS]
Recently, there has been a shift, in law, towards disclosure. In November 2004 the Lord 
Advocate circulated a memorandum to his staff (General Minute No 10/04) which said 
that the prosecution should normally supply the defence with all witness statements in 
High Court  cases (i.e.  solemn cases only).  However,  a major change relating to both 
solemn and summary procedure has been brought about, (since the completion of the 
research  study  reported  here),  by  two  recent  decisions  of  the  Privy  Council32:.  Duff 
suggests that while these cases arose from the High Court of Justiciary, they appear to 
have  implications  for  summary  procedure:  “although  in  many  such  cases  witness 
statements are not taken ... it might be that henceforth police reports to the fiscal which 
summarise the evidence against the accused, and possibly even the contents of police 
notebooks will have to be disclosed.”. (See also Raitt and Ferguson (2006)) In November 
2006 the Scottish Executive asked a retired Supreme Courts  of Scotland judge (Lord 
Coulsfield) to examine the issue of disclosure.  
Despite  the  official  shift  away from the  ‘grace  and favour’  system to  automatic  and 
systematic  early  disclosure  which  Holland  and  Sinclair  requires  and  Crown  Office 
instructions, at ground level (and especially at summary level) disclosure remains very 
patchy and where it is provided is often provided before trial. In this way, the diminution 
in  the  use  of  precognitions  (deemed  by  advocates  of  fixed  payments  often  to  be 
superfluous) and which was a consequence of the introduction of fixed payments has not 
led to earlier guilty pleas as advocates of the fixed payments had suggested. In fact it has 
led to the reverse.
We now turn to look more closely at the effects of fixed payments on client pleading 
decisions.
(d) Influences on Client Pleading Decisions
In common with other English-speaking jurisdictions, a persistent criticism of Scottish 
summary process is that guilty pleas should be made earlier in the process – thus saving 
32 Sinclair v HM Advocate 2005 SLT 563; Holland v HM Advocate 2005 SLT 553
public money and reducing delay. Much of the policy debate has focused on the question 
of whether defence practitioners can (and should) be given incentives to encourage earlier 
pleas of guilty, and if so how this can be achieved most effectively.
In the study reported in this paper, clients were not interviewed. At the very outset we 
raised this matter with the Research Advisory Group33 (which oversaw the conduct of the 
research).  It  decided  that  the  research  was  not  commissioned  to  seek  the  views  and 
experiences of summary legal aid clients. The Group felt that it would not be possible for 
clients to assess what effect (if any) fixed payments had.  However, this is not to say that 
knowledge about client experiences and perspectives was unimportant to this research. 
The research was able to draw on the existing research literature into client experiences 
and perspectives, and two studies which examined the client experience and client in the 
Scottish  summary  courts  –  research  evidence  which  was  contemporaneous  with  the 
period studied  in this paper. Here we briefly outline some of the findings from these two 
studies which are particularly relevant to an appreciation of client experiences and how 
this relates to the question of plea decision-making.
Recent research from Scotland into the performance of public defence solicitors (Goriely 
et al. 2001; Tata et al 2004) has described key pressures on clients and solicitors which 
combine to produce very high rates of not guilty pleas at the first (or ‘pleading’) diet 
which later changed to guilty pleas. At custody diets, solicitors work under tremendous 
time constraints, often exacerbated by delays in prosecution serving papers on accused. 
Prosecutors are  often themselves in  no position to negotiate because they know little 
about the case. Holding an accused person in custody is more likely, all else being equal, 
to encourage a not guilty plea than where the accused is at liberty. Not surprisingly, for 
most  of  those  accused  persons  who  are  remanded  into  custody  their  first  and  most 
immediate priority is liberation.  Where bail  is  not opposed,  a not guilty plea ensures 
immediate release from remand. These, then, are some of the enduring system factors, 
which discourage guilty pleas at earliest diet and are as significant in explaining the very 
high initial not guilty plea rate as remuneration regimes.34 Nonetheless, the switch from a 
‘proportional’ (time and line) system to a virtually fixed system of payment represents a 
major shift in financial incentives.35   The fact that it was implemented with the fee set at 
33 A Research Advisory Group was established by the Scottish Executive Justice Department to oversee and 
advise the research. The group was chaired by a senior official in the Justice Department and consisted of 
representatives of: the Justice Department, the academic research team, SLAB, COPFS, representatives of 
the Law Society, representatives of some of Scotland’s (defence) bar associations, the judiciary; and, two 
independent academic experts who are highly experienced in the conduct of the kind of research which was 
to be undertaken. From the outset and throughout the study, members of this Research Advisory Group 
commented on the structure and process of the research, including on earlier drafts of this report; as well as 
on specific tools of the research (such as interview and survey schedules.
34 See also Samuel (1996); Tata et al. (2004).
35 We investigated whether during the period 1997-2002 there had been major changes of policy or practice 
in summary procedure, prosecution, or patterns of cases being prosecuted through the summary courts. The 
only one  which  appears  to  have had a  major  overall  impact  has  been  the  introduction  of  mandatory 
intermediate  diets  which  we  discuss  later.  Various  other  possible  influences  were  also  suggested  for 
investigation by members of a research advisory group to see whether they may have instead caused any 
changes in the patterns of case trajectories. These included: the introduction of racial aggravation, human 
rights challenges, the increased use of fiscal fines and other forms of diversion, transfer of cases from the 
Sheriff to the District Courts or different case mixes. Most appeared to have a relatively negligible impact 
a level which would reduce expenditure by more than 20% represents a further shift in 
financial incentives.  We have already seen how it appears to have impacted on client 
contact and the investigation of prosecution evidence. Yet, has the move from time and 
line to a system of fixed payments at a lower average case cost impacted on the stage at 
which cases conclude? 
It  is  fundamental  to  English-speaking  jurisdictions  that  pleading  decisions  belong  to 
clients, and that lawyer advice is made only in the client’s best interests. One should not, 
therefore,  expect  that  changes  to  lawyer  remuneration  regimes  will  produce  overall 
changes to case trajectories. However, the empirical literature on the relationship between 
criminal  defence  lawyers  and  their  clients  around  the  English-speaking  world  has 
consistently highlighted the relative passivity of most clients (Blumberg 1967; Bottoms 
and McClean 1976; McConville et al. 1994; Goriely et al. 2001; Tata et al. 2004). Carlen 
for example described the tendency of most clients to be, in effect, “dummy players” in 
their  own  case  (Carlen  1976). Ericson  and  Baraneck  described  defendants  as 
“dependants” in the criminal process (Ericson and Baranek 1982). This relationship of 
relative dependence is not unique to the criminal process. Similar dynamics, including 
where clients’ expectations of outcome and decision-making are largely formed by their 
adviser,  have  been  found  in  the  relationship  between  civil  lawyers  and  their  (non-
corporate) clients; and indeed between lay people and a variety of professional advisers 
(Rosenthal 1974; Sarat and Felstner 1995; Smart 1984; Mather, McEwan, and Maiman 
2001).
Moreover, the relatively weak social, educational and economic resources of most clients 
in  summary  proceedings  coupled  with  the  immediate  stress  and  anxiety  which  the 
criminal process brings means that clients tend to be in a particularly poor position to 
take firm command of their defence (Pleasence and Quirk 2001; see also Currie 2004). In 
a  separate  study,  ethnographic  research  (Tata  et  al.  2007)  into  the  construction  and 
interpretation  of  pre-sentence reports  examined,  inter  alia,  observations  of  interviews 
with clients by social  workers and communications between clients  and their defence 
lawyers.36 This research tracked the development of individual cases from the initial pre-
sentence report interview through to sentencing. Clients who had pled guilty frequently 
regarded themselves as not guilty, though they were willing to accept the advice of their 
solicitor and steering by pre-sentence report writers. A key issue for professionals is to 
‘close’ the guilty plea by persuading the client to accept their legal guilt, while carving 
out a space for mitigation. The research highlights that defence lawyers and pre-sentence 
report writers have to navigate a tricky course between mitigation and the appearance of 
exculpation (which risks the reopening of the guilty plea).  
Thus  these  two  studies   (focused  on  the  summary  courts  in  Scotland  and  are 
contemporaneous with the study reported in this paper) shed considerable light on what 
and  none  would  appear  to  have  had  a  major  and  systematic  impact.  For  further  explanation  of  the 
investigation  of  these  alternative  hypotheses  see  Stephen  and  Tata  (2006a).  Nonetheless,  we  do  not 
discount  the  possibility  that  any  changes  in  overall  case  trajectory  patterns  may  in  fact  have  been 
significantly affected by factors which bear no relationship to fixed payments. 
36 That research (ESRC award number RB000239939) has aimed to understand the process of 
communication between report writers and sentencers in the Sheriff Courts of Scotland.
clients know; want; comprehend and interpret in the process of guilty plea production. 
Both studies show that many represented clients in the Scottish summary courts tend to 
have difficulty accurately explaining the charges against them (or indeed those amended 
charges to which they chose to plead guilty). Furthermore, clients tended to conflate legal 
culpability with moral culpability: they may plead guilty for a variety of reasons but often 
do not believe they are truly guilty in the broader meaning of the word. However, most 
clients were willing to place their trust in their defence solicitor and take his/her advice. 
This contrasts with the oft repeated belief that most defendants/accused persons ‘play the 
system’ knowledgably and skilfully and have their finger on the litigation button should 
they feel their lawyer has not done everything possible. In fact, most summary clients in 
these studies were compliant, confused and passive.  Moreover, although many expressed 
frustration that their side of story was not told and they did not regard themselves as 
genuinely guilty, they accepted that their defence lawyer knew best. 
Pre-sentence report writers and defence lawyers explained a variety of ways of ensuring 
compliance  and  ‘closing’  the  guilty  plea  (Tata  et  al.  2007).  Even  among  more 
experienced  clients  who  professed  initial  confidence,  when  pressed  to  provide  clear 
explanations, most admitted that they had a fairly vague idea of the procedure in their 
case.  In contrast  to the supposition that client-satisfaction is almost entirely outcome-
orientated, in their interviews and surveys of clients, Goriely et al. found that most clients 
accepted that they were not in a position to judge the solicitor’s command of law, or 
overall  advice.  They did,  however,  feel  able  to  judge their  defence lawyer  on  client  
process issues (such as listening; being kept informed; being treated with dignity; feeling 
‘stood up for’; feeling that the lawyer cared about them; remembering the case; etc).  
These recent findings from Scotland provide further evidence that a simple market-style 
consumer-sovereignty model of client satisfaction and criminal legal services is flawed37. 
As we have seen, most summary accused persons readily admit that they cannot make 
valid evaluations of their lawyers beyond process factors.38  Pleading decisions, therefore, 
may ultimately be taken by clients, but they are heavily influenced and guided by the 
advice they receive; and shaped by expectations and agenda setting which are mediated 
by their advisors.
(e) Analysis of Case Trajectories 
Using Crown Office data for the period 1991/2 – 2002/3, we first tested to see whether 
there  had been any other  major  trends in  the  proportions  of  cases  prosecuted in  the 
District  Courts  or  for  the  Sheriff  Courts.39 We  also  conducted  statistical  analyses 
37 And indeed, to a large extent, found also in relation to individual clients in civil cases. See for example 
Moorhead et al. (2003).
38 Sherr, Moorhead and Paterson (1994), for example, succinctly put it: “[T]he client’s views on quality are 
invaluable but inherently limited.”  
39 In Scotland the accused cannot chose the court jurisdiction at which a case may be heard.  We tested to 
see  whether  there  had  been  any  statistically  significant  change  in  the  proportions  of  cases  set  for 
prosecution in the Sheriff and District Courts. On the whole there were no significant changes with only 
three exceptions: two of which long precede the introduction of fixed payments and the third of which 
(informed by interviews and surveys), which sought to measure whether there appeared 
to have been any major impacts on case trajectories, other than any possible impact of 
fixed fees. It appears that easily the most important change (other than fixed payments) in 
the period 1991-2002/3 to affect the patterns of case trajectories has been the introduction 
of mandatory intermediate diets in 1996. 40 
An Intermediate Diet is a court hearing after the initial pleading diet but before a possible 
trial diet to review whether the parties are ready to go to trial. This change was intended 
to reduce the number of trials cancelled during, on or shortly before the date of trial 
because the accused had changed his or her plea from not guilty to guilty, or, because of 
the  non-appearance  of  key  witnesses  (Scottish  Office  1993).41 Intermediate  diets  are 
intended to allow the judge to check that the accused is adhering to a not guilty plea and 
that all witnesses have been cited and are available to appear. Given the apparent impact 
of mandatory intermediate diets, we include it in the analysis here.
Has  the  introduction  of  fixed  payments  had  an  impact  on  the  ways  in  which  cases 
proceed through court? We focus primarily on the stage at which cases were concluded42. 
We have treated cases as being ‘concluded’ only when the last charge was resolved. We 
assigned the conclusion of cases to four broad stages: at the first or pleading diet (all 
cases concluded at or before the first plea was tendered); at the Intermediate Diet (all 
cases  concluded  after  the  first  plea  but  before  the  trial  diet);  before  trial  has  begun 
(including where a trial diet was held, but which concluded before evidence was led; at 
trial (i.e. after evidence has been led).
Table 2 shows the statistically estimated average proportion of cases concluding at each 
stage in the 49 Sheriff Summary courts over the period covered. It shows that following 
the introduction of fixed fees, the largest apparent effect has been the increase in the 
proportion of cases concluding at the Intermediate Diet stage (up 3.5 percentage points in  
addition to the 8 percentage points when these were made mandatory). The introduction 
of fixed payments in 1999 appears to have led to a 1.5 percentage point increase in the 
share of cases concluding on the day of trial, but before evidence is led. The proportion of 
cases concluding at a trial (i.e. after evidence has been led) fell by nearly 2 percentage 
points43.   All  of  these  changes  are  statistically  significant  at  the  (conventional)  95% 
affected both District and Sheriff courts in the same direction implying that it did not simply represent a 
transfer of cases from one level of court to the other.  
40 Intermediate diets were made mandatory (rather than optional) by the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 
1995. See Duff and McCallum (2000);  Leverick and Duff (2001).
41 See also Duff and McCallum (2000).
42 In this context, the term ‘conclusion’ refers to the stage at which there was an acquittal or conviction 
(including through a guilty plea to amended charges). The COPFS data used does not identify the basis on 
which the case was concluded i.e. whether by change of plea to guilty as libelled or to a reduced set of 
charges or  the prosecution withdrawing the case. In this context, the stage of ‘conclusion’ does not include 
sentencing diets and sentencing disposals.  
43 It should be noted that the figures given in Table 2 are not simple arithmetic averages but are estimates 
derived from statistical procedures designed to take account of differences across courts  that are unrelated 
to the policy changes e.g. differences in prosecutorial  and judicial style,  court size etc which may be 
summed up in the term ‘court culture’.  For a detailed discussion of the statistical method see Stephen and 
Tata (2006a).
confidence level.  It should be noted that in some cases the proportionate change is very 
large e.g. the increase in the proportion of cases concluding at the Intermediate Diet after 
they were made mandatory is three-fold.
(‘Insert Table 2’)
We sought to isolate statistically the impact of fixed payments from that of mandatory 
Intermediate Diets and measured any impact of fixed payments in addition to the effects 
of mandatory Intermediate Diets for the years after the introduction of fixed payments.44 
These regression analyses suggest that the introduction of fixed payments has led to a 
statistically significant reduction in the proportion of cases concluding at the Pleading 
Diet and after the commencement of trial and, in particular, a statistically significant and 
large increase in the proportion of cases concluding at the Intermediate Diets of some 
29% of their level after Intermediate Diets were made mandatory.  In other words, there 
appears to have been a ‘squeezing effect’ towards the Intermediate Diet.
Indeed,  guilty  pleas  at  the  intermediate  diet  were  widely  recognised  by  stakeholder 
practitioners as the optimal economic management of fixed payments. 
The most economic use of fixed fees is simply to plead everybody not guilty, apply for legal aid, get 
legal  aid  granted,  then  plead  them all  guilty  in  the  intermediate  diet.   [Interview 6  Stake-holder 
Defence solicitor]
You are more keen to have a case resolved that will resolve at an intermediate diet as opposed to 
going to trial on it because there is no financial benefit as such in going to trial even if there was a 
legal benefit  in going to trial and therefore if a resolution is to be reached it’s better to achieve a 
resolution at an intermediate diet instead of halfway through a trial or an hour or half an hour into a 
trial or the morning of the trial. [Telephone Interview 981585, defence solicitor].
Our telephone surveys of  and follow-up face-to-face interviews with prosecution and 
defence  practitioners  strongly  confirmed  the  finding  that  fixed  fees  have  led  to  a 
significant increase in cases concluding at the Intermediate Diet. Respondents were asked 
to describe whether their own pleading advice had changed as a result of the introduction 
of fixed payments. We also asked them whether they thought the pleading advice of other 
criminal defence solicitors had changed as a result of the introduction of fixed payments. 
Table 3 shows the results.  Respondents did not think the introduction of fixed payments 
had altered their own pleading practice, but were considerably more likely to perceive a 
44 This is done using standard multiple linear regression techniques. It should be emphasised that the impact 
of fixed fees is measured in addition to the effect of mandatory Intermediate Diets for the years after the 
introduction of fixed fees. We were also able to test whether these effects were particular to larger, rather 
than smaller courts – there were no statistically significant differences between the overall impact on case 
trajectories of fixed payments between larger and smaller courts. We also tested for differences in case 
trajectories  between different  legal  regions  (sheriffdoms)  and also between  different  individual  courts. 
There were found to be some significant differences in case trajectories between sheriffdoms and between 
individual courts but statistically these did not affect the overall impact of fixed payments. These results 
(and the method) are discussed in much greater detail by Stephen and Tata (2006a).
change  in  the  pleading  practices  of  others.45 Over  three  times  as  many  respondents 
believed others had changed their pleading practices as had changed themselves.46
(‘Insert Table 3’)
Those who believed practices had changed were asked to explain why. By far the most 
common explanation was that the fixed payments system provided an incentive to plead 
not guilty initially but to change the plea to guilty at the Intermediate Diet
I think people are more likely to try to resolve things prior to trial. In one view it is in a solicitor’s 
interests that a fixed payment be resolved prior to trial. There is no incentive for someone to take the 
matter to trial. [Telephone Survey 981366, defence solicitor]
I think far more solicitors are ready to negotiate a plea rather than go to trial, I’m quite sure 
of it.  And I think that’s straight commerce and…it’s to the disadvantage of the client [face to 
face non-stakeholder interview defence solicitor 3]
(f) Sentence Discounting?
Does  the  apparent  legal  aid  incentive  effect  of  encouraging  a  plea  of  guilty  at  the 
Intermediate Diet rather than later at trial (or indeed being found guilty after trial) tend to 
benefit clients in terms of sentencing outcomes? 
Traditionally,  the  Scottish  Court  of  Criminal  Appeal  has  been  wary  of  the  idea  of 
imposing more lenient sentences on those pleading guilty  as a matter of  presumptive  
policy.47 Rather, the provision of a sentence ‘discount’ and the extent of it, has been said 
to very much depend on the stage and circumstances of such a plea in any individual 
case. Indeed, research reported and discussed by Goriely et al. (2001) and by Tata et al. 
(2004) found no evidence of systematic sentencing differences between cases which pled 
guilty early and those which were found guilty after a trial. Nonetheless, one of the key 
reasons why clients chose to plead guilty was the pervasive belief that they would likely 
to benefit from a significantly discounted sentence.48
45 That any practitioners were prepared to say ‘yes’ in relation to their own pleading advice is in itself a 
result which we did not expect.
46 It is, perhaps, unsurprising that in response to closed survey questions about the impact on one’s own 
pleading  advice,  most  defence  solicitors  said  that  there  had been  no  impact.  Both  in  discussing  their 
observation of other defence solicitors and in response to more open questions about their own practice, 
defence solicitors tended to be more likely to suggest that there had been some impact. 
47 See, for example, Strawhorn v McLeod 1987 SCCR 413.
48 Although this may doubtless have been the case in various individual instances, it did not appear to make 
a difference across the board in otherwise similar cases.
The statistical data reported in this paper just  precedes any effects which might have 
occurred as the result of new guidance issued by the Court of Criminal Appeal in  Du 
Plooy.49 On its face, the main intention of Du Plooy appears to have been to encourage 
greater transparency (i.e. reason-giving in open court) as to whether the sentencing judge 
is applying a discount50 because of the fact of an early guilty plea.51  It does not require 
that there should be a policy of automatic discounting for an early guilty plea: whether or 
not a discount of up to around one third should be given (and the extent of it) remains a 
matter very much under the discretion of the sentencing judge. Interestingly, the research 
study reported in this paper also found that although it was very frequently mentioned, 
there  was  wide  variation  among  interviewees  as  to  the  implications  of  Du Plooy in 
practice.52 For these reasons,  and in absence of more direct  empirical  examination,  it 
would be wrong to assume that this (apparently modest) alteration in the stance of the 
Court of Criminal Appeal has had any major, systematic impact on the practice of guilty 
plea sentence discounting. In any event, the impact of fixed payments appears to have 
been both to hasten and to postpone guilty pleas – a subject to which we now turn.
(g) The Push and Pull Effects of Fixed Payments
Has the introduction of fixed payments led to an increase in the rate of guilty pleas at the 
earliest opportunity? Although the rate of pleading guilty at the intermediate diet appears 
to have increased substantially, Table 2 also suggests other shifts. The proportion of cases 
concluding at the pleading diet declined over the period 1999/2000 - 2002/3 from 59.71% 
to 56.88%.53  Regression analyses were carried out on the proportion of cases concluding 
at  each  of  the  four  stages  over  time.   These  controlled  analyses  sought  to  identify 
whether,  and by what magnitude,  these proportions changed as a  consequence of the 
introduction of fixed payments and of the introduction of mandatory intermediate diets.  
Comparisons of the magnitudes of these changes suggest, inter alia, that 78% of the net 
increase  in  conclusions  at  the  intermediate  diet  after  fixed  payments  appears  to  be 
attributable to the decrease in cases concluded at the pleading diet.  In other words, it 
appears that although fixed payments appear to have pulled the conclusion of cases back 
49 Du Plooy (Devonne) v HM Advocate (no 1) 2003 SCCR 443. See also RB v HM Advocate 2004 SCCR 
443; Smith v HM Advocate  SCCR 2004 521; McColm v HM Advocate  Court of Criminal Appeal  27 
January 2005; and Allison v P F Stranraer Court of Criminal Appeal 17 March 2005.
50 The term ‘discount’ was avoided in favour of ‘allowance’.
51 Section 196 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 was amended on October 4 2004 by the 
Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 2004 section 20(3) to insert subsection 1(A). Thus, in passing sentence, 
the court has to state whether it has chosen to apply a discount for a guilty plea and if so how such a 
sentence would have differed in the absence of such a plea; and if not why not. Again the emphasis was on 
the need for ‘transparency’ through reason-giving at the point of sentencing each individual case, but it 
does not alter the essentially permissive approach as to whether or not a discount is to be applied.  Neither 
do these developments in transparency tell the client  what the sentence would be if s/he were to plead not 
guilty at an early or late stage as opposed to deciding to maintain a plea of not guilty and run the risk of 
being found guilty by the court. Such imponderables have to be given through the lawyer’s advice.
52  It was also felt that the concept of sentence discounting was seriously undermined by the practice of 
‘sheriff/judge-shopping’.
53 Although the proportions of cases concluding at the pleading diet began to fall with the introduction of 
fixed payments, the reduction did not reach a statistically significant level until 2000/01. There is not space 
here to present the graphs of trends over time (see Stephen and Tata 2006a).
from the day of trial and after trial slightly, the much greater overall net effect appears to 
have been to push conclusions forward from the pleading diet to the intermediate diet. To 
put it another way, the introduction of fixed payments appears overall to have had a net  
postponing effect on the conclusion of cases.
    
In  telephone  and  face-to-face  interviews  we  explored  apparent  changes  in  pleading 
patterns and their reasons. Two explanations emerged. The first, is a familiar one in the 
Scottish system and long predates the introduction of fixed payments: that summary legal 
aid  cannot  be obtained  until  the  accused pleads  not  guilty.  However,  by making the 
intermediate diet such an even more comparatively attractive point at which to advise a 
plea of guilty, fixed payments may have had the effect of making the pleading diet even 
less appealing. 
The other oddity of the system was that […] you’ve got to get, you’ve got to plead not guilty initially to 
get into the fixed payment.  It means that the intermediate diet, as well as focusing back from the trial  
you are also looking forward from the pleading diet, and so that’s really a flaw in the system that 
encourages you to get at least as far as the intermediate diet, rather than encouraging you to actually 
take a frank look at the case at the outset. [Stakeholder Interview 5 SLAB Official]
The whole legal aid system is geared up to the not guilty plea. And if they were to pay us properly for 
work that we do at the beginning of a case without pleading not guilty because sometimes we will go 
and investigate or take statements or try and take statements in cases before we plead not guilty but 
we don’t get paid for that. [Telephone Interview 981575, defence solicitor]
3. CONCLUSIONS
The research reported here suggests that introduction of fixed payments into summary 
legal aid appears to have had a fairly profound effect on both case handling and patterns 
of case trajectories. We saw earlier that there was no explicit suggestion that the notion of 
swings and roundabouts should alter the character of defence work. In fact, it appears to 
have had a fairly profound impact.  
Contrary to the desire of successive governments to encourage accused persons to plead 
guilty earlier, one impact of the system of fixed payments has been to add further to 
disincentives to plead guilty at the first opportunity (the pleading diet). Commentators 
have  pointed  out  that,  in  itself,  the  legal  aid  system discourages  guilty  pleas  at  the 
pleading diet.54  Readers will recall that in Scotland summary criminal legal aid is only 
available  to  those who have pled not guilty  at  the pleading diet.55  Persons who are 
arrested and then plead guilty from custody may be represented under the duty solicitor 
scheme, while those brought to court by a citation who plead guilty may be represented 
54 See for example: Elaine Samuel, who comments “...legal aid scheme generates incentives to plead not 
guilty and to adhere to  that  plea until  such time as  access  to  legal  representation is  obtained through 
summary legal aid.” in Samuel (1996); See also  Stephen (2001); Goriely, Tata, and Paterson (1997).
55 This had been envisaged by the Scottish Office as a money saving change. For further discussion of the 
abolition of ‘the fourteen day rule’ in which summary criminal legal aid had previously been available to 
all those who pled guilty at the pleading diet, or, fourteen days thereafter, see Warner (1996).
under the ABWOR scheme.  Representation under both the duty solicitor scheme and 
under ABWOR is relatively unattractive, (financially, administratively, and in terms of 
preparation), to both solicitors and clients compared to summary legal aid.56 By cutting 
the link between solicitor time input and remuneration, the system of fixed payments 
appears to have added further to the disincentives to both client and solicitor to decide to 
plead at the earliest opportunity.  
Instead,  the  effect  of  the  introduction  of  fixed  payments  appears  to  have  led  to  a 
significant increase in the rate of guilty pleading at the Intermediate Diet with a slight 
reduction in contested trials. It does not, however, appear to have led to a reduction in the 
overall incidence of ‘cracked trials’ (pleading guilty on the day of trial). Furthermore, the 
system of fixed payments seems to have led to a reduction in client contact and a decline 
in  the  overall  levels  of  preparation and case  investigation.  Many of  the interviewees 
suggested that, as a result of these impacts, the overall effectiveness of defence work had 
diminished:  almost  none  suggested  it  had  improved.  Most  practitioners  interviewed 
suggested that there was a risk of inadequate work (especially without an increase in fee 
rates), and many felt that fixed payments encouraged other defence solicitors to cut too 
many corners. Some fiscals and defence solicitors said that they believed that there must 
have  been  an  increase  in  wrongful  convictions  as  a  result  of  the  impacts  of  fixed 
payments. Almost none said that they were unaware of the most financially ‘efficient’ 
way of organising time under fixed payments:
The most efficient way of dealing with cases is not the proper way, and the difficulty is that 
you skip on preparation. What I see happening in practice is: people will  be seen from 
custody; signed up; they’re not seen again until the Intermediate Diet; the solicitor will get 
an idea of the case from the Fiscal on the day of the Intermediate Diet.  Precious poor 
representation. That is how it  is being maximized. [original emphasis retained]. [Face-to-
face non-stakeholder defence solicitor interview 3].
You’re getting a considerably lower amount per case than you were before.  Therefore 
everybody  had  to  cut  their  coat  according  to  the  cloth.   So  therefore  repeat  visits  to 
precognose witnesses, lots of letters to the client telling them what’s happening in their 
case disappeared.  The quality of service being provided went down [face to face non-
stakeholder interview defence solicitor 6]
Whether, as a result of these apparent impacts, there has been an increase in the incidence 
of  wrongful  convictions  cannot  be  directly  confirmed  or  denied  by  this  research. 
Nonetheless, it offers some insight into the impact of fixed payments on defence work. 
None of  the  interviewees  felt  that  fixed payments  had improved the effectiveness  of 
defence  work.  In  response  to  closed telephone  survey questions,  most  of  the  depute 
fiscals  thought  the  introduction  of  fixed  payments  had  led  to  some  decline  in  the 
effectiveness  of  defence work.  A quarter  of  defence  solicitors  felt  it  had made  little 
difference; but two thirds felt it had led to a decline in the overall effectiveness of defence 
work;  and  a  few  appeared  to  suggest  quite  explicitly  that  their  own  work  was  less 
56 This is  not  to  suggest  of  course  there  are  not  a  range  of other  countervailing non-legal  aid system 
incentives (real and perceived) which strongly encourage pleading guilty at  the pleading diet (see also 
Goriely et al. 2001; Tata et al. 2004). Neither do we seek to imply here that accused persons ought to plead 
guilty earlier (or later) than they do.
effective  than  it  had  been  under  time-and-line.  In  response  to  more  open  interview 
questions and when discussing their observations of  other defence solicitors, there was 
felt to be a greater risk of wronfgul convictions, as a consequence of the impact of fixed 
payments. For example,
The likelihood is that because corners are being cut, because the defence do not have the 
funding  available  to  carry  out  full  and  thorough  investigation,  there  may  be  a  greater 
number of cases in which points are missed which result in advice being given to plead 
guilty where perhaps the better advice might have been to proceed to trial or that perhaps 
witnesses are not brought to trial and … there is likely to be a number of people convicted 
who  would  not  otherwise  have  been  convicted  [face  to  face non-stakeholder  interview 
defence solicitor 6]
Because defence agents are not  as prepared…yes,  I  think  it  probably  has gone down 
actually, I think it probably has. [face-to-face interview non-stakeholder depute fiscal]
While this research suggests that remuneration arrangements do appear to have impacted 
significantly  on  case  handling  and  case  trajectories  (including  pleading  patterns),  it 
should  not be concluded that remuneration structures are the only important influence. 
Rather, as recent analysis of cost drivers suggests (Cape and Moorhead 2005), it is one 
influence  among  several.  Indeed,  the  research  reported  here  also  shows  that  while 
financial arrangements have been one factor, personal reputation among one’s peers, and 
active judicial case management may be at least as powerful – as seen for example in the 
introduction of mandatory intermediate diets. The arrangement of legal aid remuneration 
appears to be one important factor which does lead to a significant change in the patterns 
of  case  outcomes,  but  it  is  far  from being  the  only  factor  which  influences  lawyer 
behaviour in summary justice. 
Furthermore, this paper does  not claim that dedicated and professional people, such as 
defence solicitors, abandon basic values for simple financial gain. Neither is it argued 
that commercial factors play no part at all.  Rather it suggests (in line with Goriely et al. 
2001 and Tata et al. 2004) that modifications in behaviour “will be greatest in areas of 
‘ethical indeterminacy’: where there is a choice between two courses of action, both of 
which  have  advantages  and  disadvantages”,  and  where  professionals  are  genuinely 
unsure  about  which  is  better.  “In  making  difficult  and  evenly  balanced  judgements, 
greater weight is placed on advantages that flow from one course of action that is one’s 
own interests. Less weight is placed on those that flow from actions that run contrary to 
one’s interests” (Goriely et al. 2001). The concept of ‘ethical indeterminacy’ may provide 
a  useful  framework  to  explore  the  interplay  between  financial  and  non-financial 
incentives.57 
This  research  also  gives  rise  to  a  question  about  the  political  ineffectiveness  of  the 
criminal defence profession’s opposition to changes proposed by government,  such as 
block fees and block contracting.58 Why has the profession been so unsuccessful in its 
57 The concept of ethical indeterminacy is developed further in Tata (2007).
58 In Scotland, examples include: the introduction of public defence solicitors and the rolling out of further 
public defence offices; the freezing of pay rates; the introduction of fixed payments in summary cases and 
more recent changes to payment in solemn cases. In England and Wales examples include: public defence 
opposition to what it calls ‘sausage-machine-style’ proposed reforms? For leaders of the 
criminal defence profession, a perennial dilemma must be the danger of being seen to 
have ‘cried wolf’ before. When a change such as fixed payments or block contracting is 
proposed by government  it  is  denounced as  likely to lead to a  risk  of  lower quality 
defence work. After its impact, (and many find they can adjust to make a good living out 
of it), government is emboldened to call the profession’s bluff once again. 
By flatly denying that  financial  arrangements  influence the overall  quality of defence 
work, the profession places itself in a bind which government can easily exploit. Policy 
officials know that the profession will not ever concede publicly that there may have been 
a decline in the effectiveness of defence work. To do so would be to admit publicly that 
there has been a net reduction in the effectiveness of service to clients and that financial 
arrangements play some part in how clients are advised and cases are prepared. For the 
profession, the public line instead has to be that their members have shouldered the costs 
themselves, thereby maintaining the same level of quality of service to clients. Yet, by 
making this point, the profession scores an own goal: the architects of such policies are 
thereby able to claim that their  predictions of ‘efficiency gains’ have, in effect,  been 
accepted by the profession. 
The profession’s public stance dictates that it is reduced to warn only of ‘future dangers’. 
The  profession’s  public  opposition  to  new  managerialist,  ever-higher-volume-lower-
input,  reforms is  therefore emasculated by its  refusal  to concede publicly that quality 
might  have declined as a consequence of similar  reforms. By adhering rigidly to the 
claim  that  lawyers  only  work  in  the  best  interests  of  their  clients  and  that  the 
effectiveness of service is utterly undiminished by financial arrangements, the profession 
denies  itself  any  useful  rhetorical  means  of  opposing  the  desire  of  government  for 
‘earlier’ (and more) guilty pleas nor of the erosion of adversarial practice.59 
service, franchising, contracting, competitive tendering and block contracting, etc.  
59 See also Cape (2004).
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TABLES
Table 1: Impact of fixed fees on the level of use of precognitions
% More % Less % The Same % Don’t Know
Own60 1.8 (1) 61.4 (36) 35.1 (20) 1.8 (1)
Firm’s 6.9 (4) 55.2 (33) 36.2 (22) 1.7 (1)
Others 3.3 (2) 62.3 (37) 9.8 (6) 24.6 (15)
60 Two respondents declined to answer in relation to their own practice.





% Day of 
Trial
% Trial
Under Time & Line 
(1990/1-1995/6)
63.35 4.15 21.15 11.36
Under Time & Line plus 
mand. IDs61 
59.71 12.57 17.13 10.58
Under fixed payments 
plus  mand. IDs
(1999/2000-2002/3)
56.88 16.22 18.22 8.67
61 The  analysis  takes  account  of  the  statistical  impact  of  mandatory  Intermediate  Diets  from  their 
introduction until 2002/3.
Table 3. Thinking about the overall workload, has the introduction of fixed payments had 
an impact on  pleading advice to clients?
Yes No Don’t know
Pleading advice - own62 10.2% (6) 86.4% (51) 3.4% (2)
Pleading advice - others 35.5% (22) 30.6% (19) 33.9% (21)
62 Two respondents declined to respond in relation to their own practice.
